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Abstract
Traditional techniques for handling Byzantine failures are expensive: digital signatures are too
costly, while using 3f+1 replicas is uneconomical (f denotes the maximum number of Byzantine
processes). We seek algorithms that reduce the number of replicas to 2f+1 and minimize the number
of signatures. While the first goal can be achieved in the message-and-memory model, accomplishing
the second goal simultaneously is challenging. We first address this challenge for the problem of
broadcasting messages reliably. We study two variants of this problem, Consistent Broadcast and
Reliable Broadcast, typically considered very close. Perhaps surprisingly, we establish a separation
between them in terms of signatures required. In particular, we show that Consistent Broadcast
requires at least 1 signature in some execution, while Reliable Broadcast requires O(n) signatures in
some execution. We present matching upper bounds for both primitives within constant factors. We
then turn to the problem of consensus and argue that this separation matters for solving consensus
with Byzantine failures: we present a practical consensus algorithm that uses Consistent Broadcast
as its main communication primitive. This algorithm works for n = 2f+1 and avoids signatures
in the common case – properties that have not been simultaneously achieved previously. Overall,
our work approaches Byzantine computing in a frugal manner and motivates the use of Consistent
Broadcast – rather than Reliable Broadcast– as a key primitive for reaching agreement.
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1 Introduction
Byzantine fault-tolerant computing is notoriously expensive. To tolerate f failures, we typi-
cally need n = 3f + 1 replica processes. Moreover, the agreement protocols for synchronizing
the replicas have a significant latency overhead. Part of the overhead comes from network
delays, but digital signatures – often used in Byzantine computing – are even more costly
than network delays. For instance, signing a message can be 28 times slower than sending it
over a low-latency Infiniband fabric (Appendix A shows the exact measurements).
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In this work, we study whether Byzantine computing can be frugal, meaning if it can use
few processes and few signatures. By Byzantine computing, we mean the classical problems
of broadcast and consensus. By frugality, we first mean systems with n = 2f + 1 processes,
where f is the maximum number of Byzantine processes. Such systems are clearly preferable
to systems with n = 3f + 1, as they require 33–50% less hardware. However, seminal
impossibility results imply that in the standard message-passing model with n = 2f + 1
processes, neither consensus nor various forms of broadcast can be solved, even under partial
synchrony or randomization [31]. To circumvent the above impossibility results, we consider
a message-and-memory (M&M) model, which allows processes to both pass messages and
share memory, capturing the latest hardware capabilities of enterprise servers [1, 2]. In this
model, it is possible to solve consensus with n = 2f + 1 processes and partial synchrony [2].
Frugality for us also means the ability to achieve low latency, by minimizing the number
of digital signatures used. Mitigating the cost of digital signatures is commonly done by
replacing them with more computationally efficient schemes, such as message authentication
codes (MACs). For instance, with n = 3f +1, the classic PBFT replaces some of its signatures
with MACs [21], while Bracha’s broadcast algorithm [15] relies exclusively on MACs. As we
show, when n = 2f + 1, the same signature-saving techniques are no longer applicable.
The two goals – achieving high failure resilience while minimizing the number of signatures
– prove challenging when combined. Intuitively, this is because with n = 2f + 1 processes,
two quorums may intersect only at a Byzantine process; this is not the case with n = 3f + 1.
Thus, we cannot rely on quorum intersection alone to ensure correctness; we must instead
restrict the behavior of Byzantine processes to prevent them from providing inconsistent
information to different quorums. Signatures can restrict Byzantine processes from lying, but
only if there are enough correct processes to exchange messages and cross-check information.
The challenge is to make processes prove that they behave correctly, based on the information
they received so far, while using as few signatures as possible.
We focus initially on the problem of broadcasting a message reliably – one of the simplest
and most widely used primitives in distributed computing. Here, a designated sender process
s would like to send a message to other processes, such that all correct processes deliver the
same message. The difficulty is that a Byzantine sender may try to fool correct processes
to deliver different messages. Both broadcast variants, Consistent and Reliable Broadcast,
ensure that (1) if the sender is correct, then all correct processes deliver its message, and (2)
any two correct processes that deliver a message must deliver the same message. Reliable
Broadcast ensures an additional property: if any correct process delivers a message, then all
correct processes deliver that message.
Perhaps surprisingly, in the M&M model we show a large separation between the two
broadcasts in terms of the number of signatures (by correct processes) they require. We
introduce a special form of indistinguishability argument for n = 2f + 1 processes that uses
signatures and shared memory in an elaborate way. With it, we prove lower bounds for
deterministic algorithms. For Consistent Broadcast, we prove that any solution requires one
correct process to sign in some execution, and provide an algorithm that matches this bound.
In contrast, for Reliable Broadcast, we show that any solution requires at least n − f − 2
correct processes to sign in some execution. We provide an algorithm for Reliable Broadcast
based on our Consistent Broadcast algorithm which follows the well-known Init-Echo-Ready
pattern [15] and uses up to n + 1 signatures, matching the lower bound within a factor of 2.
To lower the impact of signatures on the latency of our broadcast algorithms, we introduce
the technique of background signatures. Given the impossibility of completely eliminating
signatures, we design our protocols such that signatures are not used in well-behaved
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executions, i.e., when processes are correct and participate within some timeout. In other
words, both broadcast algorithms generate signatures in the background and also incorporate
a fast path where signatures are not used.
We next show how to use our Consistent Broadcast algorithm to improve consensus
algorithms. The algorithm is based on PBFT [20], and maintains views in which one
process is the primary. Within a view, agreement can be reached by simply having the
primary consistent-broadcast a value, and each replicator respond with a consistent broadcast.
When changing views, a total of O(n2) calls to Consistent Broadcast may be issued. The
construction within a view is similar to our Reliable Broadcast algorithm. Interestingly,
replacing this part with the Reliable Broadcast abstraction does not yield a correct algorithm;
the stronger abstraction hides information that an implementation based on Consistent
Broadcast can leverage. For the correctness of our algorithm, we rely on a technique called
history validation and on cross-validating the view-change message. Our consensus algorithm
has four features: (1) it works for n = 2f + 1 processes, (2) it issues no signatures on the
fast path, (3) it issues O(n2) signatures on a view-change and (4) it issues O(n) background
signatures within a view. As far as we know, no other algorithm achieves all these features
simultaneously. This result provides a strong motivation for the use of Consistent Broadcast
– rather than Reliable Broadcast – as a first-class primitive in the design of agreement
algorithms.
To summarize, we quantify the impossibility of avoiding signatures by proving lower
bounds on the number of signatures required to solve the two variants of the broadcast
problem – Consistent and Reliable Broadcast – and provide algorithms that match our lower
bounds. Also, we construct a practical consensus algorithm using the Consistent Broadcast
primitive. In this work, we consider the message-and-memory model [1, 2], but our results
also apply to the pure shared memory model: our algorithms do not require messages so
they work under shared memory, while our lower bounds apply a fortiori to shared memory.
2 Related Work
Message-and-memory models. We adopt a message-and-memory (M&M) model, which is a
generalization of both message-passing and shared-memory. M&M is motivated by enterprise
servers with the latest hardware capabilities – such as RDMA, RoCE, Gen-Z, and soon CXL
– which allow machines to both pass messages and share memory. M&M was introduced
by Aguilera et al. in [1], and subsequently studied in several other works [2, 6, 33, 47].
Most of these works did not study Byzantine fault tolerance, but focused on crash-tolerant
constructions when memory is shared only by subsets of processes [1, 6, 33, 47]. In [2], Aguilera
et al. consider crash- and Byzantine- fault tolerance, as well as bounds on communication
rounds on the fast path for a variant of the M&M model with dynamic access permissions
and memory failures. However, they did not study any complexity bounds off the fast path,
and in particular did not consider the number of signatures such algorithms require.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance. Lamport, Shostak and Pease [40, 46] show that Byzantine
agreement can be solved in synchronous message-passing systems iff n ≥ 3f + 1. In
asynchronous systems subject to failures, consensus cannot be solved [32]. However, this result
is circumvented by making additional assumptions for liveness, such as randomization [10, 45]
or partial synchrony [23, 31]. Even with signatures, asynchronous Byzantine agreement can
be solved in message-passing systems only if n ≥ 3f + 1 [17]. Dolev and Reischuk [30] prove a
lower bound of n(f + 1)/4 signatures for Byzantine agreement, assuming that every message
carries at least the signature of its sender.
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Byzantine Broadcast. In the message-passing model, both Consistent and Reliable Broad-
cast require n ≥ 3f + 1 processes, unless (1) the system is synchronous and (2) digital
signatures are available [17, 29, 50]. Consistent Broadcast is sometimes called Crusader
Agreement [29]. The Consistent Broadcast abstraction was used implicitly in early papers
on Byzantine broadcast [16, 52], but its name was coined later by Cachin et al. in [19].
The name “consistent broadcast” may also refer to a similar primitive used in synchronous
systems [42, 50]. Our Reliable Broadcast algorithm shares Bracha’s Init-Echo-Ready struc-
ture [15] with other broadcast algorithms [17, 48, 50], but is the first algorithm to use this
structure in shared memory to achieve Reliable Broadcast with n = 2f + 1 processes.
BFT with stronger communication primitives. Despite the known fault tolerance bounds
for asynchronous Byzantine Failure Tolerance (BFT), Byzantine consensus can be solved
in asynchronous systems with 2f + 1 processes if stronger communication mechanisms are
assumed. Some prior work solves Byzantine consensus with 2f + 1 processes using specialized
trusted components that Byzantine processes cannot control [24, 25, 26, 27, 34, 53]. These
trusted components can be seen as providing a broadcast primitive for communication. These
works assume the existence of such primitives as black boxes, and do not study the cost of
implementing them using weaker hardware guarantees, as we do in this paper. We achieve
the same Byzantine fault-tolerance by using the shared memory to prevent the adversary
from partitioning correct processes: once a correct process writes to a register, the adversary
cannot prevent another correct process from seeing the written value.
It has been shown that shared memory primitives can be useful in providing BFT if
they have access control lists or policies that dictate the allowable access patterns in an
execution [2, 5, 11, 13, 43]. Alon et al. [5] provide tight bounds for the number of strong
shared-memory objects needed to solve consensus with optimal resilience. They do not,
however, study the number of signatures required.
Early termination. The idea of having a fast path that allows early termination in well-
behaved executions is not a new one, and has appeared in work on both message-passing [2,
3, 7, 28, 35, 36, 39] and shared-memory [8, 51] systems. Most of these works measure the fast
path in terms of the number of message delays (or network rounds trips) they require, but
some also consider the number of signatures [7]. In this paper, we show that a signature-free
fast path does not prevent an algorithm from having an optimal number of overall signatures.
3 Model and Preliminaries
We consider an asynchronous message-and-memory model, which allows processes to use
both message-passing and shared-memory [1]. The system has n processes Π = {p1, . . . , pn}
and a shared memory M . Throughout the paper, the term memory refers to M , not to the
local state of processes. We sometimes augment the system with eventual synchrony (§3.2).
Communication. The memory consists of single-writer multi-reader (SWMR) read/write
atomic registers. Each process can read all registers, and has access to an unlimited supply
of registers it can write. If a process p can write to a register r, we say that p owns r. This
model is a special case of access control lists (ACLs) [43], and of dynamically permissioned
memory [2]. Additionally, every pair of processes p and q can send messages to each other
over links that satisfy the integrity and no-loss properties. Integrity requires that a message
m from p be received by q at most once and only if m was previously sent by p to q. No-loss
requires that a message m sent from p to q be eventually received by q.
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Signatures. Our algorithms assume digital signatures: each process can sign and verify
signatures. A process p may sign a value v, producing σp,v; when unambiguous, we drop the
subscripts. Given v and σp,v, a process can verify whether σp,v is a valid signature of v by p.
Failures. Up to f processes may fail by becoming Byzantine, where n = 2f + 1. Such a
process can deviate arbitrarily from the algorithm, but cannot write on a register that is not
its own, and cannot forge the signature of a correct process. As usual, Byzantine processes
can collude, e.g., by using side-channels to communicate. The memory M does not fail; such
a reliable memory is implementable from a collection of fail-prone memories [2]. We assume
that these individual memories may only fail by crashing.
3.1 Broadcast
We consider two broadcast variants: Consistent Broadcast [18, 19] and Reliable Broadcast [14,
18]. In both variants, broadcast is defined in terms of two primitives: broadcast(m) and
deliver(m). A designated sender process s is the only one that can invoke broadcast. When
s invokes broadcast(m) we say that s broadcasts m. When a process p invokes deliver(m),
we say that p delivers m.
▶ Definition 3.1. Consistent Broadcast has the following properties:
Validity If a correct process s broadcasts m, then every correct process eventually delivers m.
No duplication Every correct process delivers at most one message.
Consistency If p and p′ are correct processes, p delivers m, and p′ delivers m′, then m=m′.
Integrity If some correct process delivers m and s is correct, then s previously broadcast m.
▶ Definition 3.2. Reliable Broadcast has the following properties:
Validity, No duplication, Consistency, Integrity Same properties as in Definition 3.1.
Totality If some correct process delivers m, then every correct process eventually delivers a
message.
We remark that both broadcast variants behave the same way when the sender is correct
and broadcasts m. However, when the sender is faulty Consistent Broadcast has no delivery
guarantees for correct processes, i.e., some correct processes may deliver m, others may not.
In contrast, Reliable Broadcast forces every correct process to eventually deliver m as soon
as one correct process delivers m.
3.2 Consensus
▶ Definition 3.3. Weak Byzantine agreement [37] has the following properties:
Agreement If correct processes i and j decide val and val′, respectively, then val = val′.
Weak validity If all processes are correct and some process decides val, then val is the input
of some process.
Integrity No correct process decides twice.
Termination Eventually every correct process decides.
Our consensus algorithm (§6) satisfies agreement, validity, and integrity under asynchrony,
but requires eventual synchrony for termination. That is, we assume that for each execution
there exists a Global Stabilization Time (GST), unknown to the processes, such that from
GST onwards there is a known bound ∆ on communication and processing delays.
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4 Lower Bounds on Broadcast Algorithms
We show lower bounds on the number of signatures required to solve Consistent and Reliable
Broadcast with n = 2f +1 processes in our model. We focus on signatures by correct processes
because Byzantine processes can behave arbitrarily (including signing in any execution).
4.1 High-Level Approach
Broadly, we use indistinguishability arguments that create executions Ev and Ew that deliver
different messages v and w; then we create a composite execution E where a correct process
cannot distinguish E from Ev, while another correct process cannot distinguish E from Ew, so
they deliver different values, a contradiction. Such arguments are common in message-passing
system, where the adversary can prevent communication by delaying messages between
correct processes. However, it is not obvious how to construct this argument in shared
memory, as the adversary cannot prevent communication via the shared memory, especially
when using single-writer registers that cannot be overwritten by the adversary. Specifically, if
correct processes write their values and read all registers, then for any two correct processes,
at least one sees the value written by the other [9]. So, when creating execution E in which,
say Ev occurs first, processes executing Ew will know that others executed Ev beforehand.
We handle this complication in two ways, depending on whether the sender signs its
broadcast message. If the sender does not sign, we argue that processes executing Ew cannot
tell whether Ev was executed by correct or Byzantine processes, and must therefore still
output their original value w. This is the approach in the lower bound proof for Consistent
Broadcast (Lemma 4.1).
However, once a signature is produced, processes can save it in their memory to prove
to others that they observed a valid signature. Thus, if the sender signs its value, then
processes executing Ew cannot be easily fooled; if they see two different values signed by
the sender, then the sender is provably faulty, and correct processes can choose a different
output. So, we need another way to get indistinguishable executions. We rely on a correct
bystander process. We make a correct process b in E sleep until all other correct processes
decide. Then b wakes up and observes that E is a composition of Ev and Ew. While b can
recognize that Ev or Ew was executed by Byzantine processes, it cannot distinguish which
one. So, b cannot reliably output the same value as other correct processes. We use this
construction for Reliable Broadcast, but we believe it applies to other agreement problems
in which all correct processes must decide.
The proof is still not immediate from here. In particular, since f<n/2, correct processes
can wait until at least f+1 processes participate in each of Ev and Ew. Of those, in our
proof we assume at most f−1 processes sign values. Since we need a bystander later, only
2f processes can participate. Thus, the sets executing Ev and Ew overlap at two processes;
one must be the sender, to force decisions in both executions. Let p be the other process and
Sv and Sw be the set that execute Ev and Ew respectively, without the sender and p. Thus,
|Sv| = |Sw| = f−1.
The key complication is that if p signs its values in one of these two executions, we cannot
compose them into an execution E in which the bystander b cannot distinguish which value it
should decide. To see this, assume without loss of generality that p signs a value in execution
Ew. To create E, we need the sender s and the set Sw to be Byzantine. The sender will
produce signed versions of both v and w for the two sets to use, and Sw will pretend to
execute Ew even though they observed that Ev was executed first. Since |Sw| + |{s}| = f ,
all other processes must be correct. In particular, p will be correct, and will not produce
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the signature that it produces in Ew. Thus, the bystander b will know that Sv were correct.
More generally, the problem is that, while we know that at most f − 1 processes sign, we do
not know which processes sign. A clever algorithm can choose signing processes to defeat the
indistinguishability argument – in our case, this happens if p is a process that signs.
Due to this issue, we take a slightly different approach for the Reliable Broadcast lower
bound, first using the bystander construction to show that any Reliable Broadcast algorithm
must produce a single non-sender signature. To strengthen this to our bound, we construct
an execution in which this signature needs to be repeatedly produced. To make this approach
work, we show not just that there exists an execution in which a non-sender signature is
produced, but that for all executions of a certain form, a non-sender signature is produced.
This change in quantifiers requires care in the indistinguishability proof, and allows us to
repeatedly apply the result to construct a single execution that produces many signatures.
4.2 Proofs
In all proofs in this section, we denote by s the designated sender process in the broadcast
protocols we consider. We first show that Consistent Broadcast requires at least one signature.
▶ Lemma 4.1. Any algorithm for Consistent Broadcast in the M&M model with n = 2f + 1
and f ≥ 1 has an execution in which at least one correct process signs.
Proof. By contradiction, assume there is some algorithm A for Consistent Broadcast in the
M&M model with n = 2f + 1 and f ≥ 1 without any correct process signing. Partition Π
into 3 subsets: S1, S2, and {p}, where S1 contains the sender, |S1| = f , |S2| = f , and p is a
single process. Let v, w be two distinct messages. Consider the following executions.
Execution Eclean-v. Processes in S1 and p are correct (including the sender s), while
processes in S2 are faulty and never take a step. Initially, s broadcasts v. Since s is correct,
processes in S1 and p eventually deliver v. By our assumption that correct processes never
sign, processes in S1 and p do not sign in this execution; processes in S2 do not sign either,
because they do not take any steps.
Execution Edirty-w. Processes in S1 and S2 are correct but p is Byzantine. Initially,
p sends all messages and writes to shared memory as it did in Eclean-v (it does so without
following its algorithm; p is able to do this since no process signed in Eclean-v). Then, the
correct sender s broadcasts w and processes in S1 and S2 execute normally, while p stops
executing. Then, by correctness of the algorithm, eventually all correct processes deliver w.
By our assumption that correct processes never sign, processes in S1 and S2 do not sign in
this execution; p does not sign either, because it acts as it did in Eclean-v.
Execution Ebad. Processes in S1 are Byzantine, while processes in S2 and p are correct.
Initially, processes in S2 sleep, while processes in S1 and p execute, where processes in S1
send the same messages to p and write the same values to shared memory as in Eclean-v
(but they do not send any messages to S2), so that from p’s perspective the execution is
indistinguishable from Eclean-v. S1 are able to do this because no process signed in Eclean-v.
Therefore, p eventually delivers v. Next, processes in S1 write the initial values to their
registers1. Now, process p stops executing, while processes in S1 and S2 execute the same
steps as in Edirty-w – here, note that S2 just follows algorithm A while S1 is Byzantine and
pretends to be in an execution where s broadcasts w (S1 is able to do this because no process
1 Recall that registers are single-writer. By “their registers”, we mean the registers to which the processes
can write.
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signed in Edirty-w). Because this execution is indistinguishable from Edirty-w to processes in
S2, they eventually deliver w. At this point, correct process p has delivered v while processes
in S2 (which are correct) have delivered w, which contradicts the consistency property of
Consistent Broadcast. ◀
An algorithm for Reliable Broadcast works for Consistent Broadcast, so Lemma 4.1 also
applies to Reliable Broadcast.
We now show a separation between Consistent Broadcast and Reliable Broadcast: any
algorithm for Reliable Broadcast has an execution where at least f−1 correct processes sign.
The proof for the Reliable Broadcast lower bound has two parts. First, we show that
intuitively there are many executions in which some process produces a signature: if E is
an execution in which (1) two processes never take steps, (2) the sender is correct, and (3)
processes fail only by crashing, then some non-sender process signs. This is the heart of the
proof, and relies on the indistinguishability arguments discussed in Section 4.1. Here, we
focus only on algorithms in which at most f correct processes sign, otherwise the algorithm
trivially satisfies our final theorem.
▶ Lemma 4.2. Let A be an algorithm for Reliable Broadcast in the M&M model with
n = 2f + 1 and f ≥ 2 processes, such that in any execution at most f correct processes
sign. In all executions of A in which at least 2 processes crash initially, processes fail only by
crashing, and the sender is correct, at least one correct non-sender process signs.
Proof. By contradiction, assume some algorithm A satisfies the conditions of the lemma, but
there is some execution of A where the sender s is correct, processes fail only by crashing, and
at least 2 processes crash initially, but no correct non-sender process signs. Let Eclean-v be
such an execution, D be a set with two processes that crash initially in Eclean-v2, C = Π \ D,
and v be the message broadcast by s in Eclean-v. Consider the following executions:
Execution Eclean-w. The sender s broadcasts some message w ̸= v, D crashes initially,
and C is correct. Since s is correct, eventually all correct processes deliver w. By assumption,
at most f processes sign. Let S ⊂ C contain all processes that sign, augmented with any
other processes so that |S| = f . Let T = C \ S. Note that (1) |T | = f − 1 and (2) if s signed,
then s ∈ S, otherwise s ∈ T .
Execution Eclean-v. This execution was defined above (where s broadcasts v). Since
s is correct, eventually all correct processes deliver v. At least one process in T is correct
– call it pt – since processes in D are faulty and there are at least f + 1 correct processes.
Note that pt delivers v. We refer to pt in the next execution.
Execution Emixed-v. Processes in S are Byzantine and the rest are correct. Initially, the
execution is identical to Eclean-v, except that (1) processes in D are just sleeping not crashed,
and (2) processes in S do not send messages to processes in D (this is possible because
processes in S are Byzantine). The execution continues as in Eclean-v until pt delivers v.
Then, processes in S misbehave (they are Byzantine) and do three things: (1) they change
their states to what they were at the end of Eclean-w (this is possible because no process
in T signed in Eclean-w), (2) they write to their registers in shared memory the same last
values that they wrote in Eclean-w, and (3) they send the same messages they did in Eclean-w.
Intuitively, processes in S pretend that s broadcast w. Let t be the time at this point; we
refer to time t in the next execution. Now, we pause processes in S and let all other processes
execute, including D which had been sleeping. Since pt delivered v and processes in D are
correct, they eventually deliver v as well.
2 If more than two processes crashed initially, pick any two arbitrarily.
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Execution Ebad. Processes in T ∪ {s} are Byzantine and the rest are correct. Initially,
the execution is identical to Eclean-w, except that (1) processes in D are sleeping not crashed,
and (2) processes in T ∪ {s} do not send messages to processes in D. Execution continues as
in Eclean-w until processes in S (which are correct) deliver w. Then, processes in T ∪ {s}
misbehave and do three things: (1) they change their states to what they were in Emixed-v at
time t – this is possible because in Eclean-v (and therefore in all values and messages they
had by time t in Emixed-v), no non-sender process signed, and in particular, there were no
signatures by any process in S \ {s}; (2) they write to the registers in shared memory the
same values that they have in Emixed-v at time t; and (3) they send all messages they did
in Emixed-v up to time t. Intuitively, processes in T ∪ {s} pretend that s broadcast v. Now,
processes in D start executing. In fact, execution continues as in Emixed-v from time t onward,
where processes is S are paused and all other processes execute (including D). Because these
processes cannot distinguish the execution from Emixed-v, eventually they deliver v. Note
that processes in D are correct and they deliver v, while processes in S are also correct and
deliver w – contradiction. ◀
In the final stage of the proof, we leverage Lemma 4.2 to construct an execution in which
many processes sign. This is done by allowing some process to be poised to sign, and then
pausing it and letting a new process start executing. Thus, we apply Lemma 4.2 f − 1 times
to incrementally build an execution in which f − 1 correct processes sign.
▶ Theorem 4.3. Any algorithm that solves Reliable Broadcast in the M&M model with
n = 2f + 1, f ≥ 1 has an execution in which at least f−1 correct non-sender processes sign.
Proof. If f = 1, the result is trivial; it requires f − 1 = 0 processes to sign.
Now consider the case f ≥ 2. If A has an execution in which at least f + 1 correct
processes sign, then we are done. Now suppose A has no execution in which at least f + 1
correct processes sign. Consider the following execution of A.
All processes and s are correct. Initially, s broadcasts v. Then processes s, p1 . . . pf
participate, and the rest are delayed. This execution is indistinguishable to s, p1 . . . pf from
one in which the rest of the processes crashed. Therefore, by Lemma 4.2, some process in
p1 . . . pf eventually signs. Call p1 the first process that signs. We continue the execution
until p1’s next step is to make its signature visible. Then, we pause p1, and let pf+1 begin
executing. Again, this execution is indistinguishable to s, p2 . . . pf+1 from one in which the
rest of the processes crashed, so by Lemma 4.2, eventually some process in p2 . . . pf+1 creates
a signature and makes it visible. We let the first process to do so reach the state in which it
is about to make its signature visible, and then pause it, and let pf+2 start executing.
We continue in this way, each time pausing pi as it is about to make its signature visible,
and letting pf+i begin executing. We can apply Lemma 4.2 as long as two processes have not
participated yet. At that point, f − 1 processes are poised to make their signatures visible.
We then let these f − 1 processes each take one step. This yields an execution of A in which
f − 1 correct non-sender processes sign. ◀
5 Broadcast Algorithms
In this section we present solutions for Consistent and Reliable Broadcast. We first implement
Consistent Broadcast in Section 5.1; then we use it as a building block to implement Reliable
Broadcast, in Section 5.2. We prove the correctness of our algorithms in the full version
of our paper [4]. For both algorithms, we first describe the general execution outside the
common case, which captures behavior in the worst executions; we then describe how delivery
happens fast in the common case (without signatures).
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Process roles in broadcast. We distinguish between three process roles in our algorithms:
sender, receiver, and replicator. This is similar in spirit to the proposer-acceptor-learner
model used by Paxos [38]. Any process may play any number of roles; if all processes play all
three roles, then this becomes the standard model. The sender calls broadcast, the receivers
call deliver, and the replicators help guarantee the properties of broadcast. By separating
replicators (often servers) from senders and receivers (often clients or other servers), we
improve the practicality of the algorithms: clients, by not fulfilling the replicator role, need not
remain connected to disseminate information from other clients. Unless otherwise specified,
n and f refer only to replicators; independently, the sender and any number of receivers can
also be Byzantine. Receivers cannot send or write any values, as opposed to the sender and
replicators, but they can read the shared memory and receive messages.
Background signatures. Our broadcast algorithms produce signatures in the background.
We do so to allow the algorithms to be signature-free in the common case. Indeed, in the
common case, receivers can deliver a message without waiting for background signatures.
However, outside the common case, these signatures must still be produced by the broadcast
algorithms in case some replicators are faulty or delayed. Both algorithms require a number
of signatures that matches the bounds in Section 4 within constant factors.
5.1 Consistent Broadcast
We give an algorithm for Consistent Broadcast that issues no signatures in the common case,
when there is synchrony and no replicator is faulty. Outside this case, only the sender signs.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode. The broadcast and deliver events are called cb-
broadcast and cb-deliver, to distinguish them from rb-broadcast and rb-deliver of Reliable
Broadcast. Processes communicate by sharing an array of slots: process i can write to slots[i],
and can read from all slots. To refer to its own slot, a processes uses index me. The sender s
uses its slot to broadcast its message while replicators use their slot to replicate the message.
Every slot has two sub-slots – each a SWMR atomic register – one for a message (msg) and
one for a signature (sgn).
To broadcast a message m, the sender s writes m to its msg sub-slot (line 6). Then, in
the background, s computes its signature for m and writes it to its sgn sub-slot (line 9). The
presence of msg and sgn sub-slots allow the sender to perform the signature computation in
the background. Sender s can return from the broadcast while this background task executes.
The role of a correct replicator is to copy the sender’s message m and signature σ, provided
σ is valid. The copying of m and σ (lines 12–19) are independent events, since a signature
may be appended in the background, i.e., later than the message. The fast way to perform a
delivery does not require the presence of signatures. Note that correct replicators can have
mismatching values only when s is Byzantine and overwrites its memory.
A receiver p scans the slots of the replicators. It delivers message m when the content of
a majority (n−f) of replicator slots contains m and a valid signature by s for m, and no slot
contains a different message m′, m′ ̸= m with a valid sender signature (line 28). Slots with
sender signatures for m′ ̸= m result in a no-delivery. This scenario indicates that the sender
is Byzantine and is trying to equivocate. Slots with signatures not created by s are ignored
so that a Byzantine replicator does not obstruct p from delivering.
When there is synchrony and both the sender and replicators follow the protocol, a
receiver delivers without using signatures. Specifically, delivery in the fast path occurs when
there is unanimity, i.e., all n = 2f + 1 replicators replicated value m (line 25), regardless
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Algorithm 1 Consistent Broadcast Algorithm with sender s.
1 Shared:
2 slots - n array of "slots"; each slot is a 2-tuple (msg, sgn) of SWMR atomic registers, initialized
↪→ to (⊥, ⊥).
4 Sender code:
5 cb-broadcast(m):
6 slots[me].msg.write(m)
7 In the background:
8 σ = compute signature for m
9 slots[me].sgn.write(σ)
11 Replicator code:
12 while True:
13 m = slots[s].msg.read()
14 if m ̸= ⊥:
15 slots[me].msg.write(m)
16 sign = slots[s].sgn.read()
17 val = slots[me].msg.read()
18 if val ̸= ⊥ and sign ̸= ⊥ and sign is a valid signature for val:
19 slots[me].sgn.write(sign)
21 Receiver code:
22 while True:
23 others = scan()
24 if others[i].msg has the same value m for all i in Π: // Fast path
25 cb-deliver(m); break
26 if others contains at least n − f signed copies of the same value m
27 and (∄i: others[i].sgn is a valid signature for others[i].msg and others[i].msg ̸= m):
28 cb-deliver(m); break
30 scan():
31 others = [slots[i].(msg, sgn).read() for i in Π]
32 done = False
33 while not done:
34 done = True
35 for i in Π:
36 if others[i] == ⊥:
37 others[i] = slots[i].(msg, sgn).read()
38 if others[i] ̸= ⊥:
39 done = False
40 return others
of whether a signature is provided by s. A correct sender eventually appends σ, and n − f
correct replicators eventually copy σ over, allowing another receiver to deliver m via the slow
path, even if a replicator misbehaves, e.g., removes or changes its value.
An important detail is the use of a snapshot to read replicators’ slots (line 23), as opposed
to a simple collect. The scan operation is necessary to ensure that concurrent reads of the
replicators’ slots do not return views that can cause correct receivers to deliver different
messages. To see why, imagine that the scan at line 23 is replaced by a simple collect. Then,
an execution is possible in which correct receiver p1 reads some (correctly signed) message
m1 from n − f slots and finds the remaining slots empty, while another correct receiver p2
reads m2 ̸= m1 from n − f slots and finds the remaining slots empty. In this execution, p1
would go on to deliver m1 and p2 would go on to deliver m2, thus breaking the consistency
property. We present such an execution in detail in [4].
To prevent scenarios where correct receivers see different values at a majority of replicator
slots, the scan operation works as follows (lines 30–40): first, it performs a collect of the slots.
If all the slots are non-empty, then we are done. Otherwise, we re-collect the empty slots
until no slot becomes non-empty between two consecutive collects. This suffices to avoid the
problematic scenario above and to guarantee liveness despite f Byzantine processes.
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5.2 Reliable Broadcast
We now give an algorithm for Reliable Broadcast that issues no signatures in the common
case, and issues only n + 1 signatures in the worst case. Algorithm 3 (part of Appendix B)
shows the pseudocode.
Processes communicate by sharing arrays Echo and Ready, which have the same structure
of sub-slots as slots in Section 5.1. Echo[i] and Ready[i] are writable only by replicator i, while
the sender s communicates with the replicators using an instance of Consistent Broadcast
(CB) and does not access Echo or Ready. In this CB instance, s invokes cb-broadcast, acting
as sender for CB, and the replicators invoke cb-deliver, acting as receivers for CB.
To broadcast a message, s cb-broadcasts ⟨Init,m⟩ (line 6). Upon delivering the sender’s
message ⟨Init,m⟩, each replicator writes m to its Echo msg sub-slot (line 13). Then, in the
background, a replicator computes its signature for m and writes it to its Echo sgn sub-slot
(line 16). By the consistency property of Consistent Broadcast, if two correct replicators r
and r′ deliver ⟨Init,m⟩ and ⟨Init, m′⟩ respectively, from s, then m = m′. Essentially, correct
replicators have the same value or ⊥ in their Echo msg sub-slot.
Next, replicators populate their Ready slots with a ReadySet. A replicator r constructs
such a ReadySet from the n − f signed copies of m read from the Echo slots (lines 19–28).
In the background, r reads the Ready slots of other replicators and copies over – if r has not
written one already – any valid ReadySet (line 36). Thus, totality is ensured (Definition 3.2),
as the ReadySet created by any correct replicator is visible to all correct receivers.
To deliver m, a receiver p reads n − f valid ReadySets for m (line 45).3 This is necessary
to allow a future receiver p′ deliver a message as well. Suppose that p delivers m by reading a
single valid ReadySet R.4 Then, the following scenario prevents p′ from delivering: let sender
s be Byzantine and let R be written by a Byzantine replicator r. Moreover, let a single
correct replicator have cb-delivered m, while the remaining correct replicators do not deliver
at all, which is allowed by the properties of Consistent Broadcast. So, the ReadySet contains
values from a single correct replicator and f other Byzantine replicators. If r removes R
from its Ready slot, it will block the delivery for p′ since no valid ReadySet exists in memory.
A receiver p can also deliver the sender’s message m using a fast path. The signature-less
fast path occurs when p reads m from the Echo slots of all replicators (line 43), and the
delivery of the Init message by the replicators is done via the fast path of Consistent
Broadcast. This is the common case, when replicators are not faulty and replicate messages
timely. Note that p delivering m via the fast path does not prevent another receiver p′ from
delivering. Process p′ delivers m via the fast path if all the Echo slots are in the same state
as for p. Otherwise, e.g., some Byzantine replicators overwrite their Echo slots, p′ delivers m
by relying on the n − f correct replicators following the protocol (line 45).
6 Consensus
We now give an algorithm for consensus using Consistent Broadcast as its communication
primitive, rather than the commonly used primitive, Reliable Broadcast. Our algorithm is
based on the PBFT algorithm [20, 21] and proceeds in a sequence of (consecutive) views. It
has four features: (1) it works for n = 2f + 1 processes, (2) it issues no signatures in the
common case, (3) it issues O(n2) signatures on a view-change and (4) it issues O(n) required
background signatures within a view.
3 In contrast to Algorithm 1, receivers need not use the scan operation when gathering information from
the replicators’ Ready slots because there can only be a single value with a valid ReadySet.
4 A similar argument that breaks totality applies if p were to deliver m by reading n − f signed values of
m in the replicators’ Echo slots.
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Our algorithm uses a sequence of Consistent Broadcast instances indexed by a broadcast
sequence number k. When process p broadcasts its kth message m, we say that p broadcasts
(k, m). We assume the following ordering across instances, which can be trivially guaranteed:
(FIFO delivery) For k ≥ 1, no correct process delivers (k, mk) from p unless it has delivered
(i, mi) from p, for all i < k.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode. The full version of our paper [4] has its correctness
proof. The protocol proceeds in a sequence of consecutive views. Each view has a primary
process, defined as the view number mod n (line 6). A view has two phases, Prepare and
Commit. There is also a view-change procedure initiated by a ViewChange message.
When a process is the primary (line 9), it broadcasts a Prepare message with its estimate
init (line 11), which is either its input value or a value acquired in the previous view (line 10).
Upon receiving a valid Prepare message, a replica broadcasts a Commit message (line 20)
with the estimate it received in the Prepare message. We define a Prepare to be valid
when it originates from the primary and either (a) view = 0 (any estimate works), or (b)
view > 0 and the estimate in the Prepare message has a proof from the previous view.
The extended paper [4] details the conditions for a message to be valid. When a replica
receives an invalid Prepare message from the primary or times out, it broadcasts a Commit
message with ⊥. If a replica accepts a Prepare message with val as estimate and n − f
matching Commit messages (line 24), it decides on val.
Algorithm 2 Consensus protocol based on Consistent Broadcast (n = 2f + 1)
1 propose(vi):
2 viewi = 0; esti = ⊥; auxi = ⊥
3 proofi = ∅; vci= (0, ⊥, ∅)
4 decidedi = False
5 while True:
6 pi = viewi % n
8 // Phase 1
9 if pi == i:
10 initi = esti if esti ̸= ⊥ else vi
11 cb-broadcast(⟨Prepare, viewi, initi, proofi⟩)
12 wait until receive valid ⟨Prepare, viewi, val, proof⟩ from pi or timeout on pi
13 if received valid ⟨Prepare, viewi, val, proof⟩ from pi:
14 auxi = val
15 vci = (viewi,val,proof)
16 else:
17 auxi = ⊥
19 // Phase 2
20 cb-broadcast(⟨Commit, viewi, auxi⟩)
21 wait until receive valid ⟨Commit, viewi, *⟩ from n − f processes
22 and (∀j: receive valid ⟨Commit, viewi, *⟩ from j or timeout on j)
23 ∀j: Ri[j] = val if received valid ⟨Commit, viewi, val⟩ from j else ⊥
24 if ∃val ̸= ⊥ : #val(Ri)≥ n − f and auxi == val:
25 try_decide(val)
27 // Phase 3
28 cb-broadcast(⟨ViewChange, viewi + 1, vci⟩σi )
29 wait until receive n − f non-conflicting view-change certificates for viewi + 1
30 proofi = set of non-conflicting view-change certificates
31 esti = val in proofi associated with the highest view
32 viewi = viewi + 1
34 In the background:
35 when cb-deliver valid ⟨ViewChange, view’, vc⟩σj from j:
36 cb-broadcast(⟨ViewChangeAck, d⟩σi ) // d is the view-change message being ACKed
38 try_decide(val):
39 if not decidedi:
40 decidedi = True
41 decide(val)
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The view-change procedure ensures that all correct replicas eventually reach a view
with a correct primary and decide. It uses an acknowledgement phase similar to PBFT
with MACs [21]. While in [21] the mechanism is used so that the primary can prove the
authenticity of a view-change message sent by a faulty replica, we use this scheme to ensure
that (a) a faulty participant cannot lie about a committed value in its ViewChange message
and (b) valid ViewChange messages can be received by all correct replicas.
A replica starts a view-change by broadcasting a signed ViewChange message with its
view-change tuple (line 28). The view-change tuple (view, val, proofval) is updated when a
replica receives a valid Prepare message (line 15). It represents the last non-empty value a
replica accepted as a valid estimate and the view when this occurred. We use the value’s
proof, proofval, to prevent a Byzantine replica from lying about its value: suppose a correct
replica decides val in view v, but in view v + 1, the primary p is silent, and so no correct
replica hears from p; without the proof, a Byzantine replica could claim to have accepted
val′ in v + 1 from p during the view-change to v + 1, thus overriding the decided value val.
When a replica receives a valid ViewChange message, it responds by broadcasting
a signed ViewChangeAck containing the ViewChange message (line 36). A common
practice is to send a digest of this message instead of the entire message [20]. We define a
ViewChange message m from p to be valid when the estimate in the view-change tuple
corresponds to the value broadcast by p in its latest non-empty Commit and m’s proof is
valid. We point out that, as an optimization, this proof can be removed from the view-change
tuple and be provided upon request when required to validate ViewChange messages. For
instance, in the scenario described above, when a (correct) replica r did not accept val ′ in
view v + 1, as claimed by the Byzantine replica r′, r can request r′ to provide a proof for val ′.
A view-change certificate consists of a ViewChange message and n−f −1 corresponding
ViewChangeAck messages. This way, each view-change certificate has the contribution of
at least one correct replica, who either produces the ViewChange message or validates a
ViewChange message. Thus, when a correct replica r receives a view-change certificate
relayed by the primary, r can trust the contents of the certificate.
To move to the next view, a replica must gather a set of n−f non-conflicting view-change
certificates Ψ. This step is performed by the primary of the next view, who then includes this
set with its Prepare message for the new view. Two view-change certificates conflict if their
view-change messages carry a tuple with different estimates ( ̸= ⊥), valid proof, and same
view number. If the set Ψ consists of tuples with estimates from different views, we select
the estimate associated with the highest view. Whenever any correct replica decides on a
value val within a view, the protocol ensures a set of non-conflicting view-change certificates
can be constructed only for val and hence the value is carried over to the next view(s).
Discussion
We discuss how Algorithm 2 achieves the four features mentioned at the beginning of Section 6.
The first feature (the algorithm solves consensus with n = 2f + 1 processes) follows directly
from the correctness of the algorithm. The second feature (the algorithm issues no signatures
in the common case) holds because in the common case, processes will be able to deliver
the required Prepare and Commit messages and decide in the first view, without having
to wait for any signatures to be produced or verified. The third feature (the algorithm
issues O(n2) signatures on view-change) holds because, in the worst case, during a view
change each process will sign and broadcast a ViewChange message, thus incurring O(n)
signatures in total, and, for each such message, each other process will sign and broadcast a
ViewChangeAck message, thus incurring O(n2) signatures. The fourth feature states that
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the algorithm issues O(n) required background signatures within a view. These signatures
are incurred by cb-broadcasting Prepare and Commit messages. In every view, correct
processes broadcast a Commit message, thus incurring n − f = O(n) signatures in total.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing algorithm has achieved all these four features
simultaneously. The only broadcast-based algorithm which solves consensus with n = 2f + 1
processes that we are aware of, that of Correia et al. [27], requires O(n) calls to Reliable
Broadcast before any process can decide; this would incur O(n2) required background
signatures when using our Reliable Broadcast implementation – significantly more than our
algorithm’s O(n) required background signatures.
At this point, the attentive reader might have noticed that our consensus algorithm uses
some techniques that bear resemblance to our Reliable Broadcast algorithm in Section 5.
Namely, the primary of a view cb-broadcasts a Prepare message which is then echoed by the
replicas in the form of Commit messages. Also, during view change, a replica’s ViewChange
message is echoed by other replicas in the form of ViewChangeAck messages. This is
reminiscent of the Init-Echo technique used by our Reliable Broadcast algorithm.
Thus, the following question arises: Can we replace each instance of the witnessing
technique in our algorithm by a single Reliable Broadcast call and thus obtain a conceptually
simpler algorithm, which also satisfies the three above-mentioned properties? Perhaps
surprisingly, the resulting algorithm is incorrect. It allows an execution which breaks
agreement in the following way: a correct replica p1 rb-delivers some value v from the
primary and decides v; sufficiently many other replicas time out waiting for the primary’s
value and change views without “knowing about” v; in the next view, the primary rb-broadcasts
v′, which is delivered and decided by some correct replica p2.
Intuitively, by using a single Reliable Broadcast call instead of multiple Consistent
Broadcast calls, some information is not visible to the consensus protocol. Specifically: while
it is true that, in order for p1 to deliver v in the execution above, n − f processes must echo v
(and thus they “know about” v), this knowledge is however encapsulated inside the Reliable
Broadcast abstraction and not visible to the consensus protocol. Thus, the information
cannot be carried over to the view-change, even by correct processes. This intuition provides
a strong motivation to use Consistent Broadcast – rather than Reliable Broadcast – as a
first-class primitive in the design of Byzantine-resilient agreement algorithms.
7 Conclusion
A common tool to address Byzantine failures is to use signatures or lots of replicas. However,
modern hardware makes these techniques prohibitive: signatures are much more costly than
network communication, and excessive replicas are expensive. Hence, we seek algorithms
that minimize the number of signatures and replicas. We applied this principle to broadcast
primitives in the message-and-memory model, and derived algorithms that avoid signatures
in the common case, use nearly-optimal number of signatures in the worst case, and require
only n = 2f+1 replicas. We proved worst-case lower bounds on the number of signatures
required by Consistent Broadcast and Reliable Broadcast, showing a separation between
these problems. We presented the first Byzantine consensus algorithm for n = 2f+1 without
signatures in the common case. A novelty of our protocol is the use of Consistent Broadcast
instead of Reliable Broadcast, which resulted in fewer signatures than existing consensus
protocols based on Reliable Broadcast.
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A APPENDIX: Latency
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Figure 1 RDMA communication is significantly faster than signature creation using CPU or
hardware acceleration (FPGA). The graph shows the latency of sending or signing a 32-byte message.
IB means Infiniband, a faster interconnect than Ethernet found in data centers. TCP latencies are
obtained using sockperf [44]. RDMA latency is obtained using perftest [41]. Signatures use optimized
implementations for CPU [12] and FPGA [49] of the ECDSA algorithm on the secp256k1 elliptic
curve [22]. An FPGA improves the throughput of signature creation (not shown in figure), but not
its latency, due to their relatively low clock speeds (compared to CPUs) and the non-parallelizable
nature of algorithms for digital signature.
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B APPENDIX: Reliable Broadcast Algorithm
Algorithm 3 Reliable Broadcast Algorithm with sender s.
1 Shared:
2 Echo, Ready - n array of "slots"; each slot is a 2-tuple (msg, sgn) of SWMR atomic registers,
↪→ initialized to (⊥, ⊥).
4 Sender code:
5 rb-broadcast(m):
6 cb-broadcast(⟨Init,m⟩)
8 Replicator code:
9 state = WaitForSender // ∈{WaitForSender,WaitForEchos}
10 while True:
11 if state == WaitForSender:
12 if cb-delivered ⟨Init,m⟩ from s:
13 Echo[me].msg.write(m)
14 In the background:
15 σ = compute signature for m
16 Echo[me].sgn.write(σ)
17 state = WaitForEchos
19 if state == WaitForEchos:
20 ReadySet = ∅
21 for i ∈ Π:
22 other = Echo[i].(msg,sgn).read()
23 if other.msg == m and other.sgn is m validly signed by i:
24 ReadySet.add((i,other))
26 if size(ReadySet) ≥ n − f:
27 ready = True
28 Ready[me].msg.write(ReadySet)
30 In the background:
31 while True
32 if not ready:
33 others = [Ready[i].msg.read() for i in Π]
34 if ∃i: others[i] is a valid ReadySet:
35 ready = True
36 Ready[me].msg.write(others[i])
38 Receiver code:
39 while True:
40 others = [Echo[i].msg.read() for i in Π]
41 proofs = [Ready[i].msg.read() for i in Π]
42 if others contains n matching values m: // Fast path
43 rb-deliver(m); break
44 if proofs contains n − f valid ReadySet for the same value m:
45 rb-deliver(m); break
DISC 2021
